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https://gitlab2.federez.net/re2o/re2o
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874 lines
25 KiB
Text
874 lines
25 KiB
Text
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# -*- text -*-
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##
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## eap.conf -- Configuration for EAP types (PEAP, TTLS, etc.)
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##
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## $Id: 0e8d5caef5ad09dfa6acb14c5d475bae55cf4b27 $
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#######################################################################
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#
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# Whatever you do, do NOT set 'Auth-Type := EAP'. The server
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# is smart enough to figure this out on its own. The most
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# common side effect of setting 'Auth-Type := EAP' is that the
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# users then cannot use ANY other authentication method.
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#
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eap {
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# Invoke the default supported EAP type when
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# EAP-Identity response is received.
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#
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# The incoming EAP messages DO NOT specify which EAP
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# type they will be using, so it MUST be set here.
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#
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# For now, only one default EAP type may be used at a time.
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#
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# If the EAP-Type attribute is set by another module,
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# then that EAP type takes precedence over the
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# default type configured here.
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#
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default_eap_type = md5
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# A list is maintained to correlate EAP-Response
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# packets with EAP-Request packets. After a
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# configurable length of time, entries in the list
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# expire, and are deleted.
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#
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timer_expire = 60
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# There are many EAP types, but the server has support
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# for only a limited subset. If the server receives
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# a request for an EAP type it does not support, then
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# it normally rejects the request. By setting this
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# configuration to "yes", you can tell the server to
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# instead keep processing the request. Another module
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# MUST then be configured to proxy the request to
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# another RADIUS server which supports that EAP type.
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#
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# If another module is NOT configured to handle the
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# request, then the request will still end up being
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# rejected.
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ignore_unknown_eap_types = no
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# Cisco AP1230B firmware 12.2(13)JA1 has a bug. When given
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# a User-Name attribute in an Access-Accept, it copies one
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# more byte than it should.
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#
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# We can work around it by configurably adding an extra
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# zero byte.
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cisco_accounting_username_bug = no
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#
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# Help prevent DoS attacks by limiting the number of
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# sessions that the server is tracking. For simplicity,
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# this is taken from the "max_requests" directive in
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# radiusd.conf.
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max_sessions = ${max_requests}
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# Supported EAP-types
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#
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# We do NOT recommend using EAP-MD5 authentication
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# for wireless connections. It is insecure, and does
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# not provide for dynamic WEP keys.
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#
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md5 {
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}
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#
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# EAP-pwd -- secure password-based authentication
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#
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# pwd {
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# group = 19
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#
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# server_id = theserver@example.com
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# This has the same meaning as for TLS.
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# fragment_size = 1020
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# The virtual server which determines the
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# "known good" password for the user.
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# Note that unlike TLS, only the "authorize"
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# section is processed. EAP-PWD requests can be
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# distinguished by having a User-Name, but
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# no User-Password, CHAP-Password, EAP-Message, etc.
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# virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"
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# }
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# Cisco LEAP
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#
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# We do not recommend using LEAP in new deployments. See:
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# http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5TP012ACKE.html
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#
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# Cisco LEAP uses the MS-CHAP algorithm (but not
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# the MS-CHAP attributes) to perform it's authentication.
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#
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# As a result, LEAP *requires* access to the plain-text
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# User-Password, or the NT-Password attributes.
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# 'System' authentication is impossible with LEAP.
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#
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leap {
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}
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# Generic Token Card.
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#
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# Currently, this is only permitted inside of EAP-TTLS,
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# or EAP-PEAP. The module "challenges" the user with
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# text, and the response from the user is taken to be
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# the User-Password.
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#
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# Proxying the tunneled EAP-GTC session is a bad idea,
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# the users password will go over the wire in plain-text,
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# for anyone to see.
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#
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gtc {
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# The default challenge, which many clients
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# ignore..
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#challenge = "Password: "
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# The plain-text response which comes back
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# is put into a User-Password attribute,
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# and passed to another module for
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# authentication. This allows the EAP-GTC
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# response to be checked against plain-text,
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# or crypt'd passwords.
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#
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# If you say "Local" instead of "PAP", then
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# the module will look for a User-Password
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# configured for the request, and do the
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# authentication itself.
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#
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auth_type = PAP
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}
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## Common TLS configuration for TLS-based EAP types
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#
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# See raddb/certs/README for additional comments
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# on certificates.
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#
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# If OpenSSL was not found at the time the server was
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# built, the "tls", "ttls", and "peap" sections will
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# be ignored.
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#
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# If you do not currently have certificates signed by
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# a trusted CA you may use the 'snakeoil' certificates.
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# Included with the server in raddb/certs.
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#
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# If these certificates have not been auto-generated:
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# cd raddb/certs
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# make
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#
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# These test certificates SHOULD NOT be used in a normal
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# deployment. They are created only to make it easier
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# to install the server, and to perform some simple
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# tests with EAP-TLS, TTLS, or PEAP.
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#
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# See also:
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#
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# http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,9286052~mode=flat
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#
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# Note that you should NOT use a globally known CA here!
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# e.g. using a Verisign cert as a "known CA" means that
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# ANYONE who has a certificate signed by them can
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# authenticate via EAP-TLS! This is likely not what you want.
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tls-config tls-common {
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private_key_password = whatever
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private_key_file = /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key
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# If Private key & Certificate are located in
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# the same file, then private_key_file &
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# certificate_file must contain the same file
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# name.
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#
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# If ca_file (below) is not used, then the
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# certificate_file below MUST include not
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# only the server certificate, but ALSO all
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# of the CA certificates used to sign the
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# server certificate.
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certificate_file = /etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem
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# Trusted Root CA list
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#
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# ALL of the CA's in this list will be trusted
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# to issue client certificates for authentication.
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#
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# In general, you should use self-signed
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# certificates for 802.1x (EAP) authentication.
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# In that case, this CA file should contain
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# *one* CA certificate.
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#
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ca_file = /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
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# OpenSSL will automatically create certificate chains,
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# unless we tell it to not do that. The problem is that
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# it sometimes gets the chains right from a certificate
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# signature view, but wrong from the clients view.
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#
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# When setting "auto_chain = no", the server certificate
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# file MUST include the full certificate chain.
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# auto_chain = yes
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#
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# If OpenSSL supports TLS-PSK, then we can use
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# a PSK identity and (hex) password. When the
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# following two configuration items are specified,
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# then certificate-based configuration items are
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# not allowed. e.g.:
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#
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# private_key_password
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# private_key_file
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# certificate_file
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# ca_file
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# ca_path
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#
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# For now, the identity is fixed, and must be the
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# same on the client. The passphrase must be a hex
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# value, and can be up to 256 hex digits.
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#
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# Future versions of the server may be able to
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# look up the shared key (hexphrase) based on the
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# identity.
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#
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# psk_identity = "test"
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# psk_hexphrase = "036363823"
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#
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# For DH cipher suites to work, you have to
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# run OpenSSL to create the DH file first:
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#
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# openssl dhparam -out certs/dh 2048
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#
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dh_file = ${certdir}/dh
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#
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# If your system doesn't have /dev/urandom,
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# you will need to create this file, and
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# periodically change its contents.
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#
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# For security reasons, FreeRADIUS doesn't
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# write to files in its configuration
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# directory.
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#
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# random_file = /dev/urandom
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#
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# This can never exceed the size of a RADIUS
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# packet (4096 bytes), and is preferably half
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# that, to accommodate other attributes in
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# RADIUS packet. On most APs the MAX packet
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# length is configured between 1500 - 1600
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# In these cases, fragment size should be
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# 1024 or less.
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#
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# fragment_size = 1024
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# include_length is a flag which is
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# by default set to yes If set to
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# yes, Total Length of the message is
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# included in EVERY packet we send.
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# If set to no, Total Length of the
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# message is included ONLY in the
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# First packet of a fragment series.
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#
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# include_length = yes
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# Check the Certificate Revocation List
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#
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# 1) Copy CA certificates and CRLs to same directory.
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# 2) Execute 'c_rehash <CA certs&CRLs Directory>'.
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# 'c_rehash' is OpenSSL's command.
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# 3) uncomment the lines below.
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# 5) Restart radiusd
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# check_crl = yes
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# Check if intermediate CAs have been revoked.
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# check_all_crl = yes
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ca_path = ${cadir}
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#
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# If check_cert_issuer is set, the value will
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# be checked against the DN of the issuer in
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# the client certificate. If the values do not
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# match, the certificate verification will fail,
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# rejecting the user.
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#
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# In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done
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# more generally by checking the value of the
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# TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer attribute. This check
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# can be done via any mechanism you choose.
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#
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# check_cert_issuer = "/C=GB/ST=Berkshire/L=Newbury/O=My Company Ltd"
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#
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# If check_cert_cn is set, the value will
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# be xlat'ed and checked against the CN
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# in the client certificate. If the values
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# do not match, the certificate verification
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# will fail rejecting the user.
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#
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# This check is done only if the previous
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# "check_cert_issuer" is not set, or if
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# the check succeeds.
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#
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# In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done
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# more generally by checking the value of the
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# TLS-Client-Cert-CN attribute. This check
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# can be done via any mechanism you choose.
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#
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# check_cert_cn = %{User-Name}
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#
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# Set this option to specify the allowed
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# TLS cipher suites. The format is listed
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# in "man 1 ciphers".
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#
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# For EAP-FAST, use "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
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#
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cipher_list = "DEFAULT"
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# Work-arounds for OpenSSL nonsense
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# OpenSSL 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g do not calculate
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# the EAP keys correctly. The fix is to upgrade
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# OpenSSL, or disable TLS 1.2 here.
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#
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# For EAP-FAST, this MUST be set to "yes".
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#
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# disable_tlsv1_2 = no
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#
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#
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# Elliptical cryptography configuration
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#
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# Only for OpenSSL >= 0.9.8.f
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#
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ecdh_curve = "prime256v1"
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#
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# Session resumption / fast reauthentication
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# cache.
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#
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# The cache contains the following information:
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#
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# session Id - unique identifier, managed by SSL
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# User-Name - from the Access-Accept
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# Stripped-User-Name - from the Access-Request
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# Cached-Session-Policy - from the Access-Accept
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#
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# The "Cached-Session-Policy" is the name of a
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# policy which should be applied to the cached
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# session. This policy can be used to assign
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# VLANs, IP addresses, etc. It serves as a useful
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# way to re-apply the policy from the original
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# Access-Accept to the subsequent Access-Accept
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# for the cached session.
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#
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# On session resumption, these attributes are
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# copied from the cache, and placed into the
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# reply list.
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#
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# You probably also want "use_tunneled_reply = yes"
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# when using fast session resumption.
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#
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cache {
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#
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# Enable it. The default is "no". Deleting the entire "cache"
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# subsection also disables caching.
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#
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# You can disallow resumption for a particular user by adding the
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# following attribute to the control item list:
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#
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# Allow-Session-Resumption = No
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#
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# If "enable = no" below, you CANNOT enable resumption for just one
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# user by setting the above attribute to "yes".
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#
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enable = yes
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#
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# Lifetime of the cached entries, in hours. The sessions will be
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# deleted/invalidated after this time.
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#
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lifetime = 24 # hours
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#
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# The maximum number of entries in the
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# cache. Set to "0" for "infinite".
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#
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# This could be set to the number of users
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# who are logged in... which can be a LOT.
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#
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max_entries = 255
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#
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# Internal "name" of the session cache. Used to
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# distinguish which TLS context sessions belong to.
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#
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# The server will generate a random value if unset.
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# This will change across server restart so you MUST
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# set the "name" if you want to persist sessions (see
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# below).
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#
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#name = "EAP module"
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#
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# Simple directory-based storage of sessions.
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# Two files per session will be written, the SSL
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# state and the cached VPs. This will persist session
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# across server restarts.
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#
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# The server will need write perms, and the directory
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# should be secured from anyone else. You might want
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# a script to remove old files from here periodically:
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#
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# find ${logdir}/tlscache -mtime +2 -exec rm -f {} \;
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#
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# This feature REQUIRES "name" option be set above.
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#
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#persist_dir = "${logdir}/tlscache"
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}
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#
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# As of version 2.1.10, client certificates can be
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# validated via an external command. This allows
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# dynamic CRLs or OCSP to be used.
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#
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# This configuration is commented out in the
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# default configuration. Uncomment it, and configure
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# the correct paths below to enable it.
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#
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# If OCSP checking is enabled, and the OCSP checks fail,
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# the verify section is not run.
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#
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# If OCSP checking is disabled, the verify section is
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# run on successful certificate validation.
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#
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verify {
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# If the OCSP checks succeed, the verify section
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# is run to allow additional checks.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# If you want to skip verify on OCSP success,
|
||
|
# uncomment this configuration item, and set it
|
||
|
# to "yes".
|
||
|
# skip_if_ocsp_ok = no
|
||
|
|
||
|
# A temporary directory where the client
|
||
|
# certificates are stored. This directory
|
||
|
# MUST be owned by the UID of the server,
|
||
|
# and MUST not be accessible by any other
|
||
|
# users. When the server starts, it will do
|
||
|
# "chmod go-rwx" on the directory, for
|
||
|
# security reasons. The directory MUST
|
||
|
# exist when the server starts.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# You should also delete all of the files
|
||
|
# in the directory when the server starts.
|
||
|
# tmpdir = /tmp/radiusd
|
||
|
|
||
|
# The command used to verify the client cert.
|
||
|
# We recommend using the OpenSSL command-line
|
||
|
# tool.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The ${..ca_path} text is a reference to
|
||
|
# the ca_path variable defined above.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename} is the name
|
||
|
# of the temporary file containing the cert
|
||
|
# in PEM format. This file is automatically
|
||
|
# deleted by the server when the command
|
||
|
# returns.
|
||
|
# client = "/path/to/openssl verify -CApath ${..ca_path} %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename}"
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# OCSP Configuration
|
||
|
# Certificates can be verified against an OCSP
|
||
|
# Responder. This makes it possible to immediately
|
||
|
# revoke certificates without the distribution of
|
||
|
# new Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
ocsp {
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Enable it. The default is "no".
|
||
|
# Deleting the entire "ocsp" subsection
|
||
|
# also disables ocsp checking
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
enable = no
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The OCSP Responder URL can be automatically
|
||
|
# extracted from the certificate in question.
|
||
|
# To override the OCSP Responder URL set
|
||
|
# "override_cert_url = yes".
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
override_cert_url = yes
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# If the OCSP Responder address is not extracted from
|
||
|
# the certificate, the URL can be defined here.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
url = "http://127.0.0.1/ocsp/"
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# If the OCSP Responder can not cope with nonce
|
||
|
# in the request, then it can be disabled here.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# For security reasons, disabling this option
|
||
|
# is not recommended as nonce protects against
|
||
|
# replay attacks.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Note that Microsoft AD Certificate Services OCSP
|
||
|
# Responder does not enable nonce by default. It is
|
||
|
# more secure to enable nonce on the responder than
|
||
|
# to disable it in the query here.
|
||
|
# See http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc770413%28WS.10%29.aspx
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# use_nonce = yes
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Number of seconds before giving up waiting
|
||
|
# for OCSP response. 0 uses system default.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# timeout = 0
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Normally an error in querying the OCSP
|
||
|
# responder (no response from server, server did
|
||
|
# not understand the request, etc) will result in
|
||
|
# a validation failure.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# To treat these errors as 'soft' failures and
|
||
|
# still accept the certificate, enable this
|
||
|
# option.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Warning: this may enable clients with revoked
|
||
|
# certificates to connect if the OCSP responder
|
||
|
# is not available. Use with caution.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# softfail = no
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
## EAP-TLS
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# As of Version 3.0, the TLS configuration for TLS-based
|
||
|
# EAP types is above in the "tls-config" section.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
tls {
|
||
|
# Point to the common TLS configuration
|
||
|
tls = tls-common
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# As part of checking a client certificate, the EAP-TLS
|
||
|
# sets some attributes such as TLS-Client-Cert-CN. This
|
||
|
# virtual server has access to these attributes, and can
|
||
|
# be used to accept or reject the request.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# virtual_server = check-eap-tls
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
## EAP-TTLS
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The TTLS module implements the EAP-TTLS protocol,
|
||
|
# which can be described as EAP inside of Diameter,
|
||
|
# inside of TLS, inside of EAP, inside of RADIUS...
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Surprisingly, it works quite well.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
ttls {
|
||
|
# Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters
|
||
|
# are in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS
|
||
|
# v2.x is being used, all the options of the tls-config
|
||
|
# section may also appear instead in the 'tls' section
|
||
|
# above. If that is done, the tls= option here (and in
|
||
|
# tls above) MUST be commented out.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
tls = tls-common
|
||
|
|
||
|
# The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
|
||
|
# which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
|
||
|
# EAP module. Inside of the TTLS tunnel, we recommend
|
||
|
# using EAP-MD5. If the request does not contain an
|
||
|
# EAP conversation, then this configuration entry is
|
||
|
# ignored.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
default_eap_type = md5
|
||
|
|
||
|
# The tunneled authentication request does not usually
|
||
|
# contain useful attributes like 'Calling-Station-Id',
|
||
|
# etc. These attributes are outside of the tunnel,
|
||
|
# and normally unavailable to the tunneled
|
||
|
# authentication request.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# By setting this configuration entry to 'yes',
|
||
|
# any attribute which is NOT in the tunneled
|
||
|
# authentication request, but which IS available
|
||
|
# outside of the tunnel, is copied to the tunneled
|
||
|
# request.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# allowed values: {no, yes}
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
copy_request_to_tunnel = yes
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# As of version 3.0.5, this configuration item
|
||
|
# is deprecated. Instead, you should use
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# update outer.session-state {
|
||
|
# ...
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# }
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# This will cache attributes for the final Access-Accept.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The reply attributes sent to the NAS are usually
|
||
|
# based on the name of the user 'outside' of the
|
||
|
# tunnel (usually 'anonymous'). If you want to send
|
||
|
# the reply attributes based on the user name inside
|
||
|
# of the tunnel, then set this configuration entry to
|
||
|
# 'yes', and the reply to the NAS will be taken from
|
||
|
# the reply to the tunneled request.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# allowed values: {no, yes}
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
use_tunneled_reply = no
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The inner tunneled request can be sent
|
||
|
# through a virtual server constructed
|
||
|
# specifically for this purpose.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# If this entry is commented out, the inner
|
||
|
# tunneled request will be sent through
|
||
|
# the virtual server that processed the
|
||
|
# outer requests.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"
|
||
|
|
||
|
# This has the same meaning, and overwrites, the
|
||
|
# same field in the "tls" configuration, above.
|
||
|
# The default value here is "yes".
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# include_length = yes
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Unlike EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS does not require a client
|
||
|
# certificate. However, you can require one by setting the
|
||
|
# following option. You can also override this option by
|
||
|
# setting
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# in the control items for a request.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# require_client_cert = yes
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
## EAP-PEAP
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
|
||
|
##################################################
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# !!!!! WARNINGS for Windows compatibility !!!!!
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
##################################################
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# If you see the server send an Access-Challenge,
|
||
|
# and the client never sends another Access-Request,
|
||
|
# then
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# STOP!
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The server certificate has to have special OID's
|
||
|
# in it, or else the Microsoft clients will silently
|
||
|
# fail. See the "scripts/xpextensions" file for
|
||
|
# details, and the following page:
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# http://support.microsoft.com/kb/814394/en-us
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# For additional Windows XP SP2 issues, see:
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# http://support.microsoft.com/kb/885453/en-us
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# If is still doesn't work, and you're using Samba,
|
||
|
# you may be encountering a Samba bug. See:
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6563
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Note that we do not necessarily agree with their
|
||
|
# explanation... but the fix does appear to work.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
##################################################
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
|
||
|
# which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
|
||
|
# EAP module. Inside of the TLS/PEAP tunnel, we
|
||
|
# recommend using EAP-MS-CHAPv2.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
peap {
|
||
|
# Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters
|
||
|
# are in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS
|
||
|
# v2.x is being used, all the options of the tls-config
|
||
|
# section may also appear instead in the 'tls' section
|
||
|
# above. If that is done, the tls= option here (and in
|
||
|
# tls above) MUST be commented out.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
tls = tls-common
|
||
|
|
||
|
# The tunneled EAP session needs a default
|
||
|
# EAP type which is separate from the one for
|
||
|
# the non-tunneled EAP module. Inside of the
|
||
|
# PEAP tunnel, we recommend using MS-CHAPv2,
|
||
|
# as that is the default type supported by
|
||
|
# Windows clients.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
default_eap_type = mschapv2
|
||
|
|
||
|
# The PEAP module also has these configuration
|
||
|
# items, which are the same as for TTLS.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
copy_request_to_tunnel = yes
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# As of version 3.0.5, this configuration item
|
||
|
# is deprecated. Instead, you should use
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# update outer.session-state {
|
||
|
# ...
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# }
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# This will cache attributes for the final Access-Accept.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
use_tunneled_reply = no
|
||
|
|
||
|
# When the tunneled session is proxied, the
|
||
|
# home server may not understand EAP-MSCHAP-V2.
|
||
|
# Set this entry to "no" to proxy the tunneled
|
||
|
# EAP-MSCHAP-V2 as normal MSCHAPv2.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap = yes
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The inner tunneled request can be sent
|
||
|
# through a virtual server constructed
|
||
|
# specifically for this purpose.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# If this entry is commented out, the inner
|
||
|
# tunneled request will be sent through
|
||
|
# the virtual server that processed the
|
||
|
# outer requests.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"
|
||
|
|
||
|
# This option enables support for MS-SoH
|
||
|
# see doc/SoH.txt for more info.
|
||
|
# It is disabled by default.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# soh = yes
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The SoH reply will be turned into a request which
|
||
|
# can be sent to a specific virtual server:
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# soh_virtual_server = "soh-server"
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Unlike EAP-TLS, PEAP does not require a client certificate.
|
||
|
# However, you can require one by setting the following
|
||
|
# option. You can also override this option by setting
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# in the control items for a request.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# require_client_cert = yes
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# This takes no configuration.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Note that it is the EAP MS-CHAPv2 sub-module, not
|
||
|
# the main 'mschap' module.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# Note also that in order for this sub-module to work,
|
||
|
# the main 'mschap' module MUST ALSO be configured.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# This module is the *Microsoft* implementation of MS-CHAPv2
|
||
|
# in EAP. There is another (incompatible) implementation
|
||
|
# of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP by Cisco, which FreeRADIUS does not
|
||
|
# currently support.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
mschapv2 {
|
||
|
# Prior to version 2.1.11, the module never
|
||
|
# sent the MS-CHAP-Error message to the
|
||
|
# client. This worked, but it had issues
|
||
|
# when the cached password was wrong. The
|
||
|
# server *should* send "E=691 R=0" to the
|
||
|
# client, which tells it to prompt the user
|
||
|
# for a new password.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The default is to behave as in 2.1.10 and
|
||
|
# earlier, which is known to work. If you
|
||
|
# set "send_error = yes", then the error
|
||
|
# message will be sent back to the client.
|
||
|
# This *may* help some clients work better,
|
||
|
# but *may* also cause other clients to stop
|
||
|
# working.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# send_error = no
|
||
|
|
||
|
# Server identifier to send back in the challenge.
|
||
|
# This should generally be the host name of the
|
||
|
# RADIUS server. Or, some information to uniquely
|
||
|
# identify it.
|
||
|
# identity = "FreeRADIUS"
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
## EAP-FAST
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# The FAST module implements the EAP-FAST protocol
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# fast {
|
||
|
# Point to the common TLS configuration
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# cipher_list though must include "ADH" for anonymous provisioning.
|
||
|
# This is not as straight forward as appending "ADH" alongside
|
||
|
# "DEFAULT" as "DEFAULT" contains "!aNULL" so instead it is
|
||
|
# recommended "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2" is used
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# tls = tls-common
|
||
|
|
||
|
# PAC lifetime in seconds (default: seven days)
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# pac_lifetime = 604800
|
||
|
|
||
|
# Authority ID of the server
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# if you are running a cluster of RADIUS servers, you should make
|
||
|
# the value chosen here (and for "pac_opaque_key") the same on all
|
||
|
# your RADIUS servers. This value should be unique to your
|
||
|
# installation. We suggest using a domain name.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# authority_identity = "1234"
|
||
|
|
||
|
# PAC Opaque encryption key (must be exactly 32 bytes in size)
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# This value MUST be secret, and MUST be generated using
|
||
|
# a secure method, such as via 'openssl rand -hex 32'
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# pac_opaque_key = "0123456789abcdef0123456789ABCDEF"
|
||
|
|
||
|
# Same as for TTLS, PEAP, etc.
|
||
|
#
|
||
|
# virtual_server = inner-tunnel
|
||
|
# }
|
||
|
}
|